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treatment crowds out small donors (donors giving $5 or less).
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Abstract
We conducted a field experiment with a charitable group to investigate whether giving the donor
an option to write a personal message to the recipient influences giving behavior. Over 1,500
households were approached in a door-to-door campaign and randomized to either a control or a
treatment in which donors could include a card for the recipient. We predict that treatment
should increase contributions through making the gift more meaningful, but may also decrease
contribution rate by increasing the social or other cost of donating. We find evidence in favor of
the cost effect, and no evidence of increased giving.
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1. Introduction
Charitable giving has continued to increase in economic importance, with $298.42 billion
– over 2% of U.S. GDP – contributed to charity in 2011 alone.1 At the same time, approximately
15-35% of total contributions are spent by charities on fundraising and administration, in
mailings, door-to-door campaigns, phone-a-thons, and the like.2 While billions are spent on
fundraising activities annually, more research is needed to determine the underlying motivation
behind giving to charitable causes, and what kinds of fundraising approaches would be most
fruitful for charities to pursue.
The related literature has used laboratory and field experiments to explore the underlying
motivation to give and to investigate ways that fundraisers can increase giving (Vesterlund,
2006; Andreoni et al., 2007). The past 25 years have seen the emergence of two major theories
that are considered key motivators in the decision to give: pure altruism, and warm glow. While
purely altruistic individuals receive utility solely from increasing the welfare of others,
individuals motivated by ‘warm glow’ receive utility from the act of giving itself (Andreoni,
1989; 1990; Korenok et al., 2013). Recent work has also identified the importance of social
pressure or shame in the motivation to give (Andreoni et al., 2012; DellaVigna et al., 2012;
Samak and Sheremeta, 2013).
We contribute to this area of research through a natural field experiment, which aims to
increase the meaningfulness of giving. Such a manipulation is designed to increase the utility
derived from the act of giving, which should then increase average amount donated. We
identified one approach that charities use in practice, allowing the donor to write a letter to the
recipient of their donation, which we believe makes the act of giving more meaningful for the
donor. This approach lends itself well to ‘adopt a child’ type charities. For example, charities
such as WorldVision or Compassion allow the donor to sponsor a child in a developing country
and also to write letters to him/her. Both pure altruism (i.e., child benefits from a letter of
encouragement) and warm glow (i.e., donor benefits from an increased sense of meaning
1

As reported by Giving USA in its 57th annual report, and re-printed in the popular press – see, for example, The
Non-Profit Times, “2011 Giving Estimated at 298.42B – 06-19-2012”
http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/article/detail/2011-giving-estimated-at-298-42b-4693 and Reuters, “U.S.
Charitable Giving Approaches $300 Billion in 2011,” June 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/19/ususa-charity-idUSBRE85I05T20120619
2
As reported by the Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, Urban Institute, Center on Philanthropy, Indiana
University. Nonprofit Overhead Cost Project: Facts and Perspectives.
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associated with the act of giving) are at play in this example. In an attempt to isolate the effect of
the letter on the utility from the act of giving, we use anonymous letters and substitute a letter
written by a volunteer in the control group.
We conducted our field experiment in partnership with a local charitable group, “Feel the
Warmth,” during their annual holiday door-to-door campaign. Over 1,500 households were
approached and randomized to either a control condition or a treatment condition. The only
difference between the two solicitations was that in the treatment condition, conditional upon
donating any amount above $0, donors could opt to include a holiday card with a message to the
unknown recipient. In the control condition, on the other hand, donors were told that “Feel the
Warmth” volunteers would provide holiday cards for recipients. The cards were not linked to the
size of gift, and were not identified with the full name of the donor. By giving donors the
opportunity to write a personalized message on a holiday card, the manipulation aimed to
increase the donors’ utility from giving. However, the manipulation may also increase the cost of
giving, as discussed below.
We do not find evidence of an increase in donation amount as a result of treatment in our
sample. To our surprise, the strongest result is that giving rates decrease. We propose that the
decrease in giving in treatment may be due to the cost of giving. First, the social cost may be
increased, in the sense that small donations may no longer be perceived as ‘socially appropriate’.
Second, there may be an opportunity cost of time from writing a card in the treatment group, or a
cognitive cost from having to make multiple decisions (both the decision to give, and decision of
whether to write the card) during the ‘ask.’
Our contribution is to add to the literature on what types of solicitations may increase
giving. Our findings also have practical relevance: fundraisers should be careful to consider the
potential effects of solicitation approaches not only on altruistically motivated solicitees but also
on those individuals who tend to be motivated by social pressure alone.

2. Related Literature
2.1 Altruistic Giving
One prediction of our model is that the experimental treatment would increase donations
through enhancing the marginal utility of giving for those who already derive utility from
altruistic acts. By providing donors the option of writing a personalized holiday card for a needy
3

recipient, the treatment aims to increase the meaning donors associate with the act of giving.
Making the charitable act more meaningful may increase contributions among solicitees
motivated by pure or impure altruism.
Laboratory experiments have found evidence that individuals are more likely to engage in
actions when they perceive those actions to be meaningful. For example, Liu and Aaker (2008)
were able to increase the perceived meaningfulness of charitable acts (and, subsequently,
donations to a charity) through priming laboratory subjects to think about the amount of time
they might donate to the charity prior to the donation decision. Meaning also plays a role in
increasing effort and worker satisfaction in the workplace (Ariely et al., 2008; Norton et al.,
2011). For example, Norton et al. (2011) find that workers value products of their own making
just as highly as (better quality) products made by professionals. Ariely et al. (2008) use
evidence from lab experiments to demonstrate that worker effort increases when the work is
more meaningful. In addition, individuals may find an action more personally meaningful if they
perceive themselves to have had a greater role in bringing the act into fruition. Evidence from the
psychology literature suggests that a greater sense of self-efficacy will increase giving through
increasing anticipated feelings of guilt at the thought of not giving (Basil et al., 2008).
Researchers have also experimentally investigated the important roles of reciprocity
(through experimental manipulations of donor gifts, see Falk, 2007; Gneezy and List, 2006),
quality signaling (through manipulation of the existence of seed grants, leadership gifts, etc., see
List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; List and Rondeau, 2003; Kumru and Vesterlund, 2010; Bracha et
al., 2011) and empathy (Verhaert and Van den Poel, 2011; Dickert et al., 2011; Basil et al.,
2008). Decreasing the social distance between giver and recipient, i.e., through revealing the
recipient’s identity, has been shown to increase giving (Jenni and Loewenstein, 1997; Charness
and Gneezy, 2008; Burnham, 2003; Bohnet and Frey, 1999a, b). Social identity and the sense of
belonging to a group also plays a role in the decision to give to others (Candelo-Londono et al.,
2011; Charness et al., 2011).
2.2 Giving due to Social Pressure
Another potential effect of treatment is to increase the social cost of giving through
increasing the perception of the donation size needed to avoid the negative effects of social
pressure. A recent literature reports that social pressure plays a major role in the decision to give.
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Laboratory experiments in which dictators are given the costly opportunity to opt out of
participating tend to achieve lower participation rates and giving amounts than experiments
where participation is mandatory (Lazear et al., 2012; Dana et al., 2006). Showing photos of
subjects who gave the lowest amount has a big effect on increasing donations in a laboratory
public goods game (Samak and Sheremeta, 2013). In the field, DellaVigna et al. (2012) cite
social pressure motivations for giving as the reason that small donors opt out of being asked to
give in a door-to-door campaign. Andreoni et al. (2012) present field evidence that individuals
take extreme measures to avoid the social pressure associated with giving. In both of the above
studies, donors are given the opportunity to opt out prior to being asked to give. This is different
from our study, since we always ask donors to give, but the perceived cost of complying with the
ask may be higher in the treatment that increases the meaning associated with giving.

3.#Conjectures#
Our aim is to present several competing theories that drive giving in treatment relative to
control and provide conjectures for each. First, for donors who donate due to impure altruism
(i.e., at least partly due to warm glow), the card treatment should enhance their utility from
making a gift. In particular,
we predict that altruistic donors would increase the amount given, which would result in an
increase on the intensive, rather than extensive, margin. This brings us to our first conjecture:
Conjecture 1: Treatment will increase giving by altruistically motivated donors,
increasing donations on the intensive margin.
On the other hand, donors who are motivated solely by social pressure give only when
asked. In DellaVigna et al. (2012), solicitees could decrease social pressure by giving any
amount greater than $0. However, we propose that the solicitation frame may change the cost of
giving at certain contribution levels. For example, it may be that presenting donors with the
option of writing a personalized holiday message may signal to donors that a large donation is
expected, even though donors were explicitly told that any amount was appreciated. Broadly, we
call this the social cost effect. Suppose there exists a level above which gifts make an impact and
below which giving a gift is functionally equivalent to giving nothing. Writing a holiday
message is an act of altruism that is at odds with giving amounts below certain levels. Solicitees
feel guiltier about small gifts when presented with the option of making their gift more
5

meaningful, and so would rather give nothing (which solicitees know to be a frequent occurrence
in fundraising campaigns).
In addition to a social cost, the card manipulation may increase the transaction cost from
giving along two dimensions. First, introducing more choices (in this case, choosing to write a
card or not) increases cognitive load. In their paper, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) find that
individuals are more likely to undertake activities that have low, versus high, number of choices.
Similarly, Bertrand et al. (2010) find that providing more options reduces take-up of loan offers.
Similarly, we may expect potential donors to decline giving if the act of giving involves
additional choices. Second, introducing the card may increase the time cost from giving – so that
potential donors with a high opportunity cost may choose not to give. This brings us to our
second conjecture:
Conjecture 2: Treatment will increase the perceived cost of giving, decreasing donations
on the extensive margin.
Some donors in the treatment group chose not to write a message, and did not incur an
opportunity cost of time. However, the heightened expectation of generosity and the cognitive
cost of making that decision were nevertheless present for these donors.

4. Experimental Design
4.1 Charities
The two groups we collaborated with in this experiment are Feel the Warmth and
Respond Now. Feel the Warmth, in Flossmoor, Illinois, is a student-run club at HomewoodFlossmoor High School that raises money every fall for the purpose of purchasing material to
make blankets for families in need. These blankets typically go to Respond Now, a registered
501(c)(03) in neighboring Chicago Heights, IL, which solicits donations of food, clothing and
furniture for its low-income clients. Respond Now agreed to deliver the blankets with the holiday
cards that were collected as part of the experiment. Flossmoor, IL is a relatively wealthy suburb
of Chicago, while nearby Chicago Heights, IL is one of the poorest.3

3

In the 2007-2011 American Community Survey, per capita income in Flossmoor is reported to be $55,187 with
2.4% below poverty level while per capital income in Chicago Heights is reported to be $17,539 with 26% below
poverty level (in 2011 inflation adjusted dollars).
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We worked with Feel the Warmth and the Advanced Placement Economics teacher at the
high school to recruit 50 volunteers (ages 17-18) who would be trained to carry out the door-todoor campaign. The volunteers were either unpaid or received National Honors Society credit for
their participation. While our students are a few years younger than those typically employed for
this sort of experiment, note that students in the United States are not new to door-to-door
solicitation. In fact, many students in Homewood-Flossmoor have engaged in door-to-door
campaigns, raising money for extra-curricular activities and societies. However, this was the first
time these students had been given a specific route and script to follow.
4.2 Treatments
We used a door-to-door campaign because this is the usual way that Feel the Warmth
would raise funds, and because our design is easy to implement in this setting. We conducted a
control and a treatment condition. The control and treatment conditions were identical in all
respects except for the ability for donors to write their own message on a holiday card in the
treatment group (see Appendix I for scripts). Solicitors were instructed to knock on the door,
deliver the solicitation message about Feel the Warmth and the cost of one blanket ($20), and ask
for a donation. In the treatment condition, solicitors also offered the option of writing a message
on the holiday card that would accompany the blanket. While all solicitees were informed of the
holiday card opportunity, only those who donated could write a holiday message, since the
holiday card would accompany the blanket they helped fund. To avoid reputation effects, donors
were asked not to include their last name on the card, and could either include a first name or no
name at all. Solicitees were told that if they donated but did not write a holiday message, a prewritten card would accompany the gift sent to the recipient. In the control condition, solicitors
informed all solicitees that a pre-written holiday card would be included with the gift.
We conducted two two-hour sessions – a morning session and an afternoon session, both
held on Saturday, December 1, 2012. We randomly assigned half of the solicitors to control or
treatment for the morning session and trained them separately (so that neither group knew what
the other would be doing). After solicitors returned for the afternoon, we flipped the groups such
that the solicitors who implemented the control condition in the morning implemented the
treatment condition in the afternoon, and the solicitors who implemented the treatment session in
the morning implemented the control condition in the afternoon. While the control and treatment

7

results from the morning session are the ‘cleanest’ in the sense that solicitors could not have
mistakenly delivered the wrong message, the afternoon session allows us to control for solicitor
fixed effects in the analysis.
4.3 Procedures
Solicitors arrived at 10 am in the morning and were asked to pair up into groups of two.
One person in each group recorded data while the other solicited donations for the entire day. We
randomly assigned half of the pairs to control and half to treatment, and trained the two groups
separately in a one-hour training session led by staff.
Following training, solicitors were given pre-selected routes to follow in the
Homewood/Flossmoor area. Upon visiting each household, solicitors were required to record key
information about each visit, including whether or not the door was opened, whether the
individual donated, the amount of donation and (in the treatment condition) whether the donor
chose to write a personalized message on a holiday card (see Appendix II). Solicitors were asked
to return after they had solicited for two hours. After lunch, we completed a 15-minute training
session on the solicitation requirements for the afternoon (during which all solicitors worked on
the alternate treatment to the one from the morning). Solicitors were again given pre-selected
routes to follow for the next 2 hours.4

5. Results
A total of 1,536 houses were approached during the experiment. Table 1 provides the
summary statistics by treatment group and session. Over one third of households approached
opened the door, and a little under half of those who opened the door gave a positive amount.
Conditional on giving, the average amount given ranged between $11 and $15. Relative to
similar door-to-door fundraising experiments (Landry et al., 2006, DellaVigna et al., 2012),
about the same fraction of households opened the door, but a substantially higher fraction of

4

The afternoon training session was shorter since solicitors were instructed to follow the previous procedure, only
using a slightly different script. Groups that switched from control to treatment also received blank holiday cards to
supply to interested donors, while unused holiday cards were taken away from groups that switched from treatment
to control.
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households contributed. We suspect that the age of our solicitors may have contributed to the
relatively high giving rates.5
First, we consider the role of treatment on probability of giving, which we expect may
decrease for the treatment group based on the role of treatment at increasing costs (Conjecture 2).
We find strong support for the role of costs in treatment – overall, the percentage of households
contributing (conditional on opening the door) is 52% in the control group and only 43% in the
treatment group, a statistically significant difference (Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney p-value <0.05).
Individuals are 20% less likely to give when given the option to write a holiday card. Splitting
the sample into morning and afternoon sessions, we find the same effect directionally for the
morning and afternoon, but only the afternoon is significantly different. This brings us to the first
result.
Result 1: The rate of giving is significantly higher in the control group relative to the
treatment group, providing support for the hypothesis that treatment increased the costs of giving
among some donors.
Result 1 is in line with our prediction that treatment may increase the cost of giving. In
particular, we may expect relatively ‘small’ donations to be crowded out, similar to the social
cost story in DellaVigna et al. (2012). We split the sample by the median gift amount ($10) and
consider those individuals giving less than $10 ‘small donors’ and those giving $10 or more
‘large donors.”

5

We also observe a higher rate of door opening and giving in the afternoon relative to the morning. It is possible
that solicitor learning about how to knock/solicit may account for this difference, or it is possible that more people
are home in the afternoon than in the morning. This difference does not hurt our results since we conducted both
treatment and control at both times of day.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics with Non-parametric t-test results
Session
Morning

Total households approached
Total households that answered door
% households that answered door
# households that contributed
% households that contributed
Average donation per household that answered door
Average donation per household that gave

Afternoon

Median donation per household that gave
Total amount raised
% households that wrote card
Total households approached
Total households that answered door
% households that answered door
# households that contributed
% households that contributed
Average donation per household that answered door
Average donation per household that gave

Full Sample

Median donation per household that gave
Total amount raised
% households that wrote card
Total households approached
Total households that answered door
% households that answered door
# households that contributed
% households that contributed
Average donation per household that answered door
Average donation per household that gave
Median donation per household that gave
Total amount raised
% households that wrote card

Control
372
136
36.6%
58
42.65%
$5.13
(10.84)
$12.03
(13.93)
$10
$697.65
N/A
393
150
38.17%
92
61.33%
$7.20
(9.55)
$12.41
(9.61)
$10
$1,080
N/A
765
286
37.39%
150
52.45%
$6.22
(10.22)
$12.26
(11.49)
$10
$1,777.65
N/A

Treatment
334
127
38.0%
47
37.01%
$5.62
(10.63)
$15.18**
(12.69)
$10
$713.31
29.79%
437
178
40.7%
83
46.63%***
$5.24
(7.92)
$11.37
(8.16)
$10
$932.36
32.53%
771
305
39.56%
130
42.62%**
$5.40
(9.13)
$12.76
(10.17)
$10
$1,645.67
31.54%

Asterisks denote significant differences between treatment and control.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1 provides kernel densities of all ‘small gifts’ in treatment and control, and
provides additional evidence that smallest donors (who would have given less than $5) are
crowded out by the treatment. Notice that except for a spike in giving at the possible focal point
of $5, gifts below $5 are less likely in treatment than in control. In Table 2, we regress treatment
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on indicators for a gift of less than $4-$9 (specifications 5-15) and observe that giving rates in
treatment are significantly lower for each of those groups. This brings us to our next result:
Result 2: The decrease in giving rates in treatment is primarily due to the exit of small
donors, providing some support for the social cost prediction.
Figure 1: Donation amounts among ‘small donors’ in control and treatment

Next, we are interested in whether the meaning manipulation increased the gift amount,
as would be predicted by Conjecture 1. Over 30% of donors in treatment chose to write a card,
suggesting that the card opportunity was valued at least by some.6 Overall, the average donation
per household that gave is $12.26 in the control group and $12.76 in the treatment group, a
difference that is in the direction we would expect if the card increased ‘warm glow’. However,
the difference is not large (only 4% higher) or statistically significant. When looking only at the

6

14 out of 29 of those who gave less than $10 in the treatment group chose to write a message on the holiday card
we provided, and only 5 who gave below $5 did so. 26 out of 53 of those who gave $10 or more in the treatment
group chose to write a message. When controlling for solicitor and solicitee demographics, the coefficient of card
on the average amount given is positive (p=0.114). However, note that our paper is concerned with the self-sorting
between giving and not giving that occurs given a solicitation attempt to increase the meaning inherent in the act of
giving. Consequently our theory focuses primarily on the effect of presenting the option to write a message. Since
the donor’s decision to write a message is endogenous, we cannot make a causal inference about the influence of
writing a message on giving behavior.
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morning session, we do find a significant difference in gift amount: $15.18 in the treatment
group, and only $12.03 in the control group. Overall amount raised across the two treatments are
also not significantly different: $1,777 in the control group, and $1,645 in the treatment group.7
Linear probability models in Table 3 provide further evidence that treatment lowers the
probability of giving. Specifications 1 and 2 report on the probability of giving, conditional on
opening the door, with and without solicitor and solicitee characteristics. We observe an overall
decrease in giving rates in the treatment group, as well as a higher rate of giving in the afternoon
session. In specifications 3-6, we investigate the rates of small (less than $10) or large ($10 or
greater) giving. We find that in specification 3, the decrease in giving rates due to treatment is
concentrated among low donors only (coefficient -0.12 with p-value <0.05). While large
donations are also decreased in treatment, the result is not statistically significant.
How can this result be reconciled with the literature finding that donations may increase
when the act of giving is perceived to be more meaningful? First, it is possible that while our
offer to write a holiday card was taken up by over 30% of donors, the card treatment did not
make giving more meaningful to the point of affecting philanthropic behavior. Second, while Liu
and Aaker (2008) made the donation decision more meaningful prior to making ‘the ask’, we
attempt to make the donation decision more meaningful as part of the ask. Manipulating the
meaning associated with giving may be more effective before the donation solicitation rather
than during the donation solicitation. Second, the increased costs of giving in the treatment group
may make it difficult for us to observe the effect described in Conjecture 1. Finally, manipulating
emotional meaning may work better with ‘warm list’ rather than ‘cold list’ donors, since a larger
proportion of ‘warm list’ donors may be altruistically motivated. Altruistically motivated donors
may seek meaningful ways to give through volunteering and signing up with Compassion or
WorldVision (the charities that allow donors to write letters to the recipient).

7

This was enough to make over 170 blankets!
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Table 2: Giving Probabilities among Small(er) Donors

VARIABLES
Treatment
Afternoon
Session

Constant

(5)
Gave less
than 4

(7)
Gave less
than 5

(9)
Gave less
than 6

(11)
Gave less
than 7

(13)
Gave less
than 8

(15)
Gave less
than 9

-0.0427**
(0.0170)

-0.0448*
(0.0237)

-0.0573*
(0.0293)

-0.0611**
(0.0286)

-0.0578*
(0.0290)

-0.0548*
(0.0307)

0.0354*
(0.0180)

0.0522**
(0.0247)

0.0613**
(0.0297)

0.0638**
(0.0290)

0.0590*
(0.0297)

0.0611*
(0.0312)

0.0549***
(0.0136)

0.0635***
(0.0189)

0.150***
(0.0244)

0.155***
(0.0241)

0.161***
(0.0250)

0.164***
(0.0251)

Observations
590
590
590
590
590
590
R-squared
0.014
0.017
0.013
0.014
0.012
0.011
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions are clustered by team. Team is missing for 1 observation among
this sample; hence we have 590 observations here as opposed to 591 in the previous table.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

13

Table 3: Regressions of Treatment Status on Giving

Dep. Var:

Treatment

Afternoon Session
Female

Indicator for Giving
(1)

(2)

-0.109*
(0.0598)
0.143**
(0.0601)

0.449***
(0.0599)

-0.100*
(0.0499)
0.144**
(0.0547)
0.0371
(0.0391)
-0.109*
(0.0544)
0.0841
(0.118)
-0.108
(0.117)
0.0133
(0.0937)
0.0714
(0.104)
0.415***
(0.0814)

590
0.030

485
0.050

Black
Hispanic
Other Race
Female Asker

Female Recorder
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Indicator for Giving
small gifts (<10)
large gifts (≥ 10)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.115**
(0.0503)
0.142***
(0.0484)

0.240***
(0.0417)

-0.0706
(0.0606)
0.111*
(0.0595)
0.0288
(0.0444)
-0.178***
(0.0517)
-0.0538
(0.204)
-0.0888
(0.134)
0.0211
(0.0978)
0.0690
(0.112)
0.343***
(0.0937)

-0.0911
(0.0641)
0.122*
(0.0676)

0.346***
(0.0642)

418
402
489
0.040
0.057
0.024
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Average Donation
(including 0)
(7)

(8)

0.542
(1.196)
-1.539
(1.544)

-0.0706
(0.0606)
0.111*
(0.0595)
0.0288
(0.0444)
-0.178***
(0.0517)
-0.0538
(0.204)
-0.0888
(0.134)
0.0211
(0.0978)
0.0690
(0.112)
0.343***
(0.0937)

13.18***
(1.555)

0.516
(1.288)
-1.011
(1.898)
-0.776
(1.816)
-1.505
(1.827)
-3.364
(4.199)
5.029
(7.377)
-0.134
(1.440)
1.414
(1.252)
12.87***
(1.990)

402
0.057

273
0.005

233
0.019

5. Conclusion
We conducted a door-to-door field experiment to investigate whether we could increase
the meaning associated with the act of giving by providing an opportunity to send a holiday
message to the recipient. We do not observe an effect of increased giving as a result of this
manipulation, but do observe a significant decrease in giving rates, concentrated among small
donors. The decrease in giving rates can be explained by greater cost of giving in the treatment
condition. This cost could be driven by increased perceived social cost from giving a small gift,
opportunity cost of time, or cognitive cost from an additional choice set.
While we document the decrease in giving due to cost, several explanations can account
for why increasing the meaning associated with giving did not lead to significant increases in
donation amounts. In particular, we used a ‘cold list’, while our manipulation may be more
effective with ‘warm list’ donors or a larger sample of altruistically motivated donors. In
addition, this particular treatment, despite being taken up by over 30% of donors, may not
enhance meaning. This could be due to being administered simultaneously with the ask, rather
than being administered immediately before the ask.
Our findings are practically relevant for practitioners. In particular, fundraisers should be
careful to consider the potential effects of solicitation approaches on the cost of giving – either
from social cost, cognitive cost, or time cost. Avenues for future work include considering the
effect of emotional meaning manipulations on warm list donors and the role of emotional
meaning in the decision to give time (volunteer). It will also be interesting to consider the effects
of different manipulations conducted just prior to, rather than during, an ask – these would be
free from a cost of giving effect.
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Appendix!I:!Solicitation!scripts!

Control Group

Hello, we are volunteers from the Feel the Warmth organization. A few
years ago, a couple of high school students in the Homewood-Flossmoor
area started a service project to help people in need keep warm during the
cold holiday season. Each year high school students raise money to
purchase fleece material, which are used to make blankets. Today we are
asking you to make a difference in somebody’s holiday season and donate.
$20 will purchase one fleece blanket, but we appreciate any amount you
contribute. A holiday card for a person in need will accompany your gift.

Treatment Group

Hello, we are volunteers from the Feel the Warmth organization. A few
years ago, a couple of high school students in the Homewood-Flossmoor
area started a service project to help people in need keep warm during the
cold holiday season. Each year high school students raise money to
purchase fleece material, which are used to make blankets. Today we are
asking you to make a difference in somebody’s holiday season and donate.
$20 will purchase one fleece blanket, but we appreciate any amount you
contribute. If you give a gift, you can write a personalized holiday card
for the person who received the blanket you contributed to.
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Appendix!II:!Data!sheets!
Figure A1: Data Sheet for Asker

Note: Addresses have been falsified to protect subject identity.
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Figure A2: Data Sheet for Recorder

Note: Addresses have been falsified to protect subject identity.
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Appendix!III:!Holiday!card!
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Appendix!IV:!Additional!Figures!
Figure A1: Histogram Distribution of Full Sample

Figure A2: Histogram of all donations by treatment (includes $0)
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